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ROASTING THE PIG TO BURN DOWN THE
HOUSE: A MODEST PROPOSAL∗
STUART MINOR BENJAMIN†
This essay addresses the question whether one should support
regulatory proposals that one believes are, standing alone, bad public
policy in the hope that they will do such harm that they will ultimately
produce (likely unintended) good results. This question can arise in many
contexts. If one opposes a certain policy that will sound attractive to
voters and/or legislators and would be popular in small doses but
disastrous in large doses, one may decide to support the large dose, in the
hope that people will soon realize their mistake. Or one may regard a set
of proposed regulations as foolish and likely to hobble the industry
regulated, but perhaps desirable if one believes that we would be better
off without that industry.
I consider this question with respect to spectrum policy. One of the
major impediments to greater spectrum liberalization is incumbents that
likely are not the highest and best use of the wireless frequencies
allocated to them. There is debate as to the desirability of spectrum
rights for particular entities versus a commons model,1 but there is no
∗ With apologies to Jonathan Swift, who is much cleverer than I am. See JONATHAN
SWIFT, A MODEST PROPOSAL (1729). As for the part before the colon, the Supreme Court
has frequently noted that some regulations, particularly in the speech context, may have such
far-reaching negative consequences that they amount to burning the house to roast the pig.
See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (“The State insists that, by …
quarantining the general reading public against books not too rugged for grown men and
women in order to shield juvenile innocence, it is exercising its power to promote the general
welfare. Surely, this is to burn the house to roast the pig.”); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564,
604-05 (2002) (“In evaluating the overbreadth of [this] statute, we should be mindful of Justice
Frankfurter’s admonition not to ‘burn the house to roast the pig.’” (quoting Butler, 352 U.S. at
383)); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127, 131 (1989) (invoking this
quotation twice, for good measure); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 882 (1997) (“In Sable, we
remarked that the speech restriction … there amounted to ‘burn[ing] the house to roast the
pig.’” (citation omitted)).
† Professor of Law, Duke Law School.
1. Compare Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the
Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 287 (1998) (envisioning new
networks that largely avoid interference, and contending that such networks will not be created
by private actors, such that the most economically efficient option is for the government to
create a wireless commons), with Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance and the Choice
Between Private and Public Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2007 (2003) (noting that either the
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real debate that our current system of spectrum rights keeps some lowervalued uses on wireless frequencies at the expense of higher-valued uses.
This phenomenon flows from legal restrictions on the services that
licensees can offer. Most existing licensees are permitted to offer a small
number of services. Other services might be more valuable, but they are
not allowed to provide them.2
Unsurprisingly, incumbents push for greater flexibility in the
services they can offer (and, ideally, the ability to subdivide and sell or
lease their spectrum rights). But while incumbents want greater
flexibility, what they resist mightily (and understandably) is any change
in spectrum policy that would reduce or eliminate their spectrum rights.
Meanwhile, the general public has an interest in spectrum rights being
devoted to their highest valued uses. That could be achieved by giving
incumbents greater flexibility. But if such flexibility seems politically
unpalatable, another way of moving to higher valued uses would be for
the government to reallocate spectrum to new uses that the public would
value more highly. And a simple way of achieving that would be to
reclaim spectrum devoted to lower valued uses from the existing
licensees, to allocate it to higher valued uses, and then to distribute
(ideally, via auction3) spectrum rights to a new set of licensees.
This last idea alarms incumbents, for the obvious reason that they
would lose something of value. And, as it turns out, incumbents have
been successful in opposing any large-scale changes in spectrum
allocation. The main reason for their success is that the wealth they
derive from their control of valuable frequencies not only gives them an
incentive to hold onto that spectrum but also gives them the funds to be
effective lobbyists. Indeed, lobbyists for spectrum incumbents have done
a good job of framing the issue. They have argued against possible
changes to spectrum allocation by questioning why the government is
trying to get rid of them. This line of argument privileges the status quo,
of course—that is its essence, and purpose. The result is that the hurdles
to changes in spectrum allocation are considerable. There have been
government or a private party will have to create protocols for the proposed networks, that
private actors will create these networks if they are as attractive as Benkler suggests, and that
the disadvantages of private control are outweighed by the disadvantages of public control).
2. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum as a First Amendment
Violation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1 (2002).
3. The literature on auctions is immense. There are tradeoffs involved, but the
consensus is that, among methods of assigning licenses to particular licensees, auctions are the
best option. See, e.g., Gregory L. Rosston & Jeffrey S. Steinberg, Using Market-Based Spectrum
Policy to Promote the Public Interest, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 87, 107-08 (1997); Pablo T. Spiller &
Carlo Cardilli, Towards a Property Rights Approach to Communications Spectrum, 16 YALE J. ON
REG. 53 (1999); Evan Kwerel & Alex D. Felker, Using Auctions to Select FCC Licensees (FCC
Off.
of
Plans
and
Pol’y,
Working
Paper
No.
16,
1985),
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp16.pdf.
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changes in spectrum allocation, and changes will continue to occur, but
what is remarkable is how little change there has been.
This matters a great deal to information policy. Simply stated,
creating new wireless services, expanding existing valuable wireless
services, and experimenting with spectrum commons are made more
difficult by the paucity of available spectrum.
In looking at current users of spectrum, two big ones jump out—
over-the-air television broadcasting and government. For decades,
broadcasting was the central use of spectrum, and the only one that was
widely profitable. That has changed with the rise of wireless services like
cellular telephony and the rise of alternatives to broadcast for the receipt
of television signals, in the form of cable and satellite television. I have
written elsewhere about the desirability of moving all, or at least most,
over-the-air television broadcasting off the spectrum, and I will not
belabor those arguments here.4 But a few points bear emphasizing. First,
86% of American households subscribe to cable or satellite.5 Second, the
main advantage of transmission via spectrum versus transmission via wire
—mobility—is largely inapplicable to broadcast television. The
percentage of televisions that are in motion, watching over-the-air
broadcast signals, and unable to access other means of receiving those
signals (such as satellite) is tiny. To put the point differently, very few
people watch broadcast television in a moving vehicle that does not have
satellite reception. Third, television broadcasting occupies hundreds of
megahertz of “prime beachfront” spectrum—frequencies that can be
utilized for a wide range of uses, including many forms of point-to-point
communication. The value of that spectrum is enormous. The revenue
generated by selling the spectrum would depend on auction prices, of
course, but the estimated range is in the hundreds of billions of dollars.6
And because service providers could not capture all the value of the
spectrum, the value to citizens—the consumer surplus created by the new

4. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating the Federal Communications Commission’s
National Television Ownership Cap: What’s Bad for Broadcasting Is Good for the Country, 46 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 439 (2004).
5. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for Delivery of Video
Programming, Annual Report, 21 FCC Rcd. 2503, app. B, tbl. B-1 (2006).
6. See Evan R. Kwerel & John R. Williams, Changing Channels: Voluntary
Reallocation of UHF Television Spectrum vii (FCC Off. of Plans & Pol’y Working Paper
Series,
Working
Paper
No.
27,
1992),
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp27.pdf. Another estimate of the
auction value of the broadcast spectrum, based on the auctions for spectrum for third
generation wireless services, is $367 billion. See Michael Calabrese, Battle Over the Airwaves:
Principles for Spectrum Policy Reform 4 (New Am. Found., Working Paper, 2001); Thomas
Lenard, No More Delays on Digital TV, C|NET, May 4, 2004, http://news.cnet.com/20101040-5203382.html.
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services—would far exceed the auction revenue.7
There would be costs to ending television broadcasting. One of
these need not (and likely would not) be the demise of the companies
that currently produce broadcasting, or a diminution in their
programming. As I discussed in an earlier article, the very likely result
would be that broadcasters would become cable and satellite channels
alongside the existing cable and satellite channels—which is the status
that broadcasters already occupy for the 86% of homes that rely on cable
or satellite.8 But there would be a cost in the form of the dislocation of
those who rely on broadcast television and cannot afford the alternatives.
There is, however, a fairly easy way to shift this cost to the government
for those people who are too poor to afford cable or satellite: the
government could pay for satellite dishes or cable hook-ups and a basic
set of channels (slightly better than those individuals were getting via
broadcast) for less than $10 billion.9 Simply stated, the costs of
subsidizing cable or satellite service for the 14% of households that do
not subscribe to cable or satellite but want television service would be a
small fraction of the value of broadcast frequencies, as reflected in the
value of those frequencies at auction once they could be used for any
service.10
It is possible that broadcasting is the highest and best use of some of
the spectrum, and thus that at least some spectrum licensees that could
offer any service would still choose to offer broadcast. That is not an
argument in favor of keeping so much spectrum devoted to broadcasting,
however: we should still leave the choice to spectrum licensees, so that
they can make their own determinations about the highest valued use of
their spectrum—whether broadcast or otherwise. But this does
underscore the fact that when I talk about the demise of broadcasting, I
am doing so on the assumption that broadcast is not the highest valued
use of the spectrum. My real complaint, though, is not with broadcasting
per se, but with spectrum allocation rules that prohibit flexibility in the
use of the broadcast spectrum.
In any event, even if broadcasting is the highest valued use of at
least a portion of the spectrum, that will almost certainly end soon. The
value of spectrum for over-the-air broadcasting will decrease as a result of
two basic trends: first, the percentage of households relying on over-the-

7. See Thomas W. Hazlett, The U.S. Digital TV Transition: Time to Toss the Negroponte
Switch 21 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Reg. Studies, Working Paper No. 01-15, 2001)
(stating that the annual consumer surplus from new wireless services on broadcast spectrum
could be as high as the total auction bids).
8. See Benjamin, supra note 4, at 496.
9. See id.; Hazlett, supra note 7, at 16.
10. See Benjamin, supra note 4, at 497-98.
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air broadcast will likely continue to decrease, as people subscribe to cable
or satellite; second, the percentage of people watching traditional overthe-air networks will almost certainly decrease, continuing a steady
decline that began more than 30 years ago.11 Indeed, the interesting
question for the future is what percentage of users will move away from
television networks (whether broadcast or cable/satellite) toward other
forms of entertainment, thus accelerating the decline of broadcast. That
is, broadcast has long been receiving a declining share of television
viewership, but this may combine with sharp declines in television
viewership overall to really hurt broadcasting. All these forces will, I
think, ultimately lead the holders of spectrum licenses for broadcast to
conclude that there are higher and better non-broadcast uses of their
spectrum rights.
If the above is correct, then the government could simply allow
broadcasters to offer any service on their spectrum (and subdivide and
lease their spectrum to third parties as they see fit), and broadcasters
would likely move away from over-the-air broadcast and to new services.
The value of other services on frequencies currently devoted to
broadcasting would be so high (and so much higher than the value of
broadcasting) that an entity free to offer any service would choose
something other than broadcasting, and make billions of dollars doing
it.12 This would be an enormous windfall for broadcasters (and,
concomitantly, deprive the government of revenues that it would receive
if it auctioned those frequencies), but perhaps that is a price worth paying
to free up the spectrum.
For better or worse, such a complete opening of broadcast spectrum
to other uses is unlikely to occur. Even more unlikely is the prospect that,
in the next few years, Congress will force broadcasting off the spectrum.
I think it is likely that broadcasting will shrivel, and thus leave the
spectrum, in 20 years. But that is a long time to wait.
This sets up the question for this essay: does it make sense to
support broadcast regulations that seem undesirable on their own terms
but that may result in such harms to broadcasting that broadcasting
leaves the spectrum sooner than it otherwise would? This question has
particular salience in light of the Federal Communications Commission’s
11. See Benjamin, supra note 4, at 482 (“In the 1970s, over 90% of viewers watched one
of the then-three major broadcast television networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC). Since that
time, cable and satellite television have changed the television landscape dramatically. The
broadcast networks’ share of television viewers has steadily declined as the cable channels’ share
has increased. In fact, cable channels now have a majority of the audience share: the now-seven
broadcast networks combined garner less than a 50% share of hours viewed.”).
12. And in the unlikely event that they freely chose to offer broadcasting on at least some
of their frequencies, we would know they were doing so because they concluded that this was
its highest valued use, not because the government’s allocation rules deprived them of options.
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January 2008 Report on Broadcast Localism13 that would effectively require
broadcasters to provide locally-oriented programming and to comply
with new administrative regulations (including advisory boards
reminiscent of the ascertainment requirements that the Commission
jettisoned in 198414) that could prove fairly costly. But the larger
question involves a host of proposals that would raise broadcasters’ costs
or reduce their potential income. Should we welcome new regulations on
broadcasters that will make broadcasting unprofitable?
My contrarian take is that the answer will often be “yes.” Some
regulations that would be undesirable standing on their own will be
desirable once we factor in the degree to which they will hasten the
demise of over-the-air broadcasting.
It is worth emphasizing that I am not talking about regulations that
impose costs but have even greater benefits on their own terms, because
such regulations are desirable in their own right. My focus here is on
regulations that have greater costs than benefits when considered in
isolation, but which are ultimately desirable because they have the added
benefit of leading broadcasting’s frequencies to be opened up sooner.
Some such regulations will, on their own terms, be near-misses in terms
of a benefit/cost analysis. That is, they will have benefits, by leading to
better programming or to some non-programming benefit (e.g., a more
fair distribution of society’s resources), but those benefits will be
outweighed by their costs. Some regulations will impose costs and have
no benefits because they are ineffectual. Finally, some regulations will
impose costs on broadcasters and not only have no benefits but also
impose additional costs in their effects (e.g., make programming worse).
My point in this essay is that the benefit of pushing broadcasting off the
spectrum may transform many of these regulations into desirable ones.
This highlights a very important consideration: if a regulation
would tend to entrench broadcasting’s place on the spectrum, then the
regulation will not help to free up the spectrum and should be avoided.
Hurting broadcasters is simply a means towards the goal of opening up
wireless frequencies, so a regulation that frustrates this goal hurts
broadcasters without achieving any countervailing benefit. The form of
entrenchment to which I am referring is regulations that increase the
benefits to government officials of having over-the-air broadcasting. This
is a straightforward principal/agent problem. Government officials (and
in particular members of Congress) have reasons to want to preserve
13. Broad. Localism, Report & Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 23 FCC Rcd. 1324 (2008);
see also Standardized and Enhanced Disclosure Requirements for Television Broadcast
Licensee Public Interest Obligations, Report & Order, 23 FCC Rcd. 1274 (2008).
14. Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Report & Order, 98
F.C.C.2d 1075, ¶ 45 (1984).
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broadcast television that have nothing to do with what their constituents
want.15 The lifeblood for elected officials—and one of the biggest
advantages of incumbency—is free advertising, for example coverage of
an official’s visits to local community events.16 The easiest and most
effective way for members of Congress to reach their constituents
without having to pay for advertising is to appear at a community event
that is covered by the local television station. Constituents have little
reason to value this coverage, but politicians do.17 Because the interests of
government representatives and their constituents are not aligned in this
respect, we have reason to expect that government actors will aim to
protect broadcast television beyond what their constituents would want.18
Indeed, the history of broadcast regulation is characterized by coziness
between government actors and incumbent broadcasters.19 This has led
to government policies that have created barriers to entry for potential
competitors and given valuable goodies to broadcasters.20
The possibility of entrenchment suggests a classification scheme for
broadcast regulations that impose costs and/or reduce revenues: We
should look to see what impact, if any, the regulations would have on
broadcasters’ behavior, and what impact they would have on government
officials’ desire to keep broadcasting alive because broadcasting benefited
them.
Some specific applications will help to flesh this out and to illustrate
the degree to which these considerations can point in different
directions. Many people would regard free airtime for political candidates

15. See Charles Platt, The Great HDTV Swindle, WIRED, Feb. 1997, at 57 (“So long as
broadcasting is protected from the free market by legislators who depend on TV to get
themselves reelected, Congress will continue giving broadcasters special treatment and favors,
and consumers will suffer.”).
16. See Mark Tushnet et al., Judicial Review and Congressional Tenure: An Observation, 66
TEX. L. REV. 967, 973 (1988) (stating that incumbents are generally better known than
challengers because of free advertising, including local television coverage of the incumbent).
17. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. Chief Talks of Frustration and Surprise, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2003, at C6 (noting that local broadcasters “have considerable influence
because they are in every Congressional district and control most of the television and radio
outlets that are vital to political life....”).
18. Polling regarding the national ownership cap supports this point. See Matthew Rose,
TV Networks Join Forces to Fight Backlash over Station Ownership, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2003,
at A1 (noting a survey showing “that only 11% [of respondents] believe network ownership of
their local station is a bad thing and 68% think the market should decide whether that should
happen or not” and quoting a pollster as saying “I have never seen a situation where politicians
have a greater disconnect from the people they represent”).
19. See THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING
BROADCAST PROGRAMMING (1994).
20. See Pablo T. Spiller & Carlo Cardilli, Towards a Property Rights Approach to
Communications Spectrum, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 53, 62-63 (1999) (suggesting that “regulators’
real interest in perpetuating the existing spectrum administration stems from their desire to
maintain the steady flow of political rents generated by control over spectrum.”).
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as a positive change in programming.21 It would also be costly for
broadcasters, and if the costs were high enough it would satisfy the
criterion of having costs exceeding its benefits. But it is also likely to
exacerbate the principal/agent problem, as it would lead politicians to
become even more desirous of keeping broadcasting alive than they
already are. Thus beyond its benefit/cost ratio standing alone, it would
have the additional cost of making broadcasters’ continued use of the
spectrum more, rather than less, likely – a step in the wrong direction.
The same might be the case for the revival of the personal attack
and political editorial rules.22 Incumbents know that their incumbency
entails a huge advantage (incumbent re-election rates for the House have
averaged 95% since 1990), and so they likely regard the personal attack
and political editorial rules as a net benefit.23 Yes, this means that their
opponents will have equal time if attacked. But it also means that the
incumbent can respond to an attack, and a sharp attack on a politician is
one of the relatively few phenomena that can significantly change the
dynamics of a political race. Since the incumbent starts as the
presumptive winner of a given election, defanging such a game-changing
possibility should benefit an incumbent more often than it hurts her. So
the imposition of personal attack and political editorial rules might
further entrench over-the-air broadcasting, creating an additional cost of
such a regulation.
One possible objection to my proposal is that there might be some
regulations that are so inefficient that the prospect of hastening the
departure of broadcasting from the airwaves will not be sufficient to
justify them. After all, my point is that the demise of over-the-air
broadcasting is a benefit that should enter into our regulatory calculus,
but there is no guarantee that that benefit will outweigh the cost of a
regulation that would otherwise be deadweight loss. My answer is that

21. See, e.g., CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, BEYOND THE 30-SECOND SPOT:
ENHANCING THE MEDIA’S ROLE IN CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS 42-65 (1988); JOHN
ELLIS, NINE SUNDAYS 18 (1991); NEWTON N. MINOW ET AL., PRESIDENTIAL
TELEVISION 159-66 (1973); Reed E. Hundt, The Public’s Airwaves: What Does the Public
Interest Require of Television Broadcasters?, 45 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1100-09 (1996).
22. These were rules mandating that broadcasters provide airtime for responses to any
“personal attacks” or “political editorials” that they broadcast. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (rejecting a First Amendment attack on the personal attack and
political editorial rules); STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW
AND POLICY 224-227 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the “tortured path” of ultimately successful
attempts to repeal these rules).
23. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Reelection Rates Over the Years,
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/reelect.php?cycle=2006 (showing that the incumbent
reelection rate for the House of Representatives since 1990 has been 95% (and the average has
been below 96% in only one of the last five election cycles), whereas Senate reelection rates
since 1990 have been a comparatively low 88%).
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we should expect a linear relationship between costs imposed on
broadcasters and the likelihood of them abandoning over-the-air
broadcasting. Every dollar of additional costs for broadcasters is one less
dollar of profit, and thus reduces the attractiveness of over-the-air
broadcasting as a business model. And don’t forget the pot of gold at the
end of the rainbow: once broadcasting leaves the spectrum, much more
valuable services can utilize those frequencies.
This does suggest one last element of desirably inefficient
regulation: it should impose costs on broadcasters but be inexpensive for
the government to administer. Government costs are not only
deadweight losses but also do not hasten the demise of broadcasting
(except insofar as they lead some regulators to want to push broadcasting
off the spectrum to eliminate those government costs – an incentive in
which we can have little confidence, given the fact that government
regulators do not bear those costs). So the most desirable form of
regulation is one that does not exacerbate the principal/agent problem
and imposes significant costs on broadcasters but not on the government.
Where should this lead us, in terms of broadcast regulation? The
most obviously desirable regulations are probably those that are pure
deadweight loss—regulations that cost broadcasters significant amounts
of money but have no impact on their behavior. This category would
include
onerous
record-keeping
requirements,
ascertainment
requirements, etc. These are unlikely to have any impact on
programming, and thus will likely be pure cost.24
Regulations that affect broadcasters’ behavior will be trickier,
because the attractiveness of the change in the broadcaster’s behavior will
often be in the eye of the beholder. But at least some regulations would
produce arguably positive changes in broadcasters’ behavior that would
not seem to increase the principal/agent problem. One example is
children’s television. The Federal Communications Commission
effectively requires three hours of children’s programming per week,
through its processing guidelines.25 Why not increase that to 15 or 25
hours per week? There will be tons more programming aimed at
educating children, and it will reduce the viewership of broadcasting and
thus hasten the demise of broadcasting – what I would regard as a winwin.

24. In rejecting the original ascertainment and record-keeping rules, the FCC found that
those rules had no real impact on programming, and instead were pure costs for broadcasters.
See The Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment
Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, Report &
Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984).
25. See Policies & Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming, Report &
Order, 11 F.C.C. Rcd. 10,660 (1996).
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Does this reasoning also apply to allowing uses, users, or licensing
regimes that one regards as bad public policy onto the spectrum in the
first place? The answer is no, for the simple reason that the power of
incumbency is strong. This is due both to the anchoring effect and, more
importantly, the fact that incumbency creates a constituency that will
lobby fiercely to keep things as they are. Such lobbying can be such a
powerful impediment to change that it seems foolhardy to create new
incumbents in the hope that the decision will be sufficiently disastrous
that it will overcome the lobbying power of the newly created
incumbents.
Do my arguments apply to government spectrum? No, because
there is a simple, and I believe realistic, way for government officials to
properly value spectrum and thus use it more efficiently. The incentive
problem is particularly large for government spectrum: Government
officials have a great incentive to keep control of as much spectrum as
possible, and no meaningful incentive to relinquish any of it. And there
is no obvious future impetus for the government to relinquish. The forces
at work are fairly straightforward. If government agents are unable to
communicate effectively over the airwaves at some future critical point,
the officials in charge of the government’s spectrum will be blamed.
Imagine the reaction if there were a repeat of the communications
difficulties that occurred for first responders at the World Trade Center
after the planes crashed into the World Trade Center on September 11,
2001.26 The public would be frustrated, and they would be incensed if
they heard that a government decision to relinquish some spectrum
contributed to the problem. Meanwhile, the opportunity cost of
underutilized spectrum is completely opaque – the public does not
recognize the costs and government officials have no incentive to
recognize them. A government official who decides to relinquish some of
her agency’s spectrum rights receives no rewards. But all of this leads to
an obvious solution, namely that the opportunity cost of spectrum be
included in agencies’ budgets, so that government agencies’ consumption
of spectrum would be as costly to them as their purchase of tangible
goods. Once we do that, we should expect government officials to use
spectrum no less efficiently than they use cars, buildings, etc.
Returning to the focus of this essay, the calculus I am advocating is
fairly straightforward: when considering the costs and benefits of a given
regulatory regime, our calculation of the benefits should include the
hastening of changes in spectrum rights that would create billions of

26. See Jim Dwyer et al., 9/11 Exposed Deadly Flaws in Rescue Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,
2002, at A1; NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 297-311 (2004).
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dollars in consumer value. There is nothing terribly radical about such a
calculation. Costs and benefits can take a variety of forms. The point
here is that what might seem like a cost (the demise of broadcasting) will
have significant benefits (the transition of the current broadcast spectrum
to other uses). The result is that regulations that might seem inefficient,
standing alone, likely will have benefits that exceed their costs once we
take into consideration the benefit of putting spectrum to a higher valued
use more quickly.
Am I serious in writing all this? Not entirely, but mostly. I do think
that society would benefit if the wireless frequencies currently devoted to
broadcast could be used for other services, and the first-best ways of
achieving that goal may not be realistic. I am proposing a second-best – a
fairly cynical second-best, but a second-best all the same. I would prefer
not to go down this path, but if that is the only way to hasten the
shriveling of broadcast’s spectrum usage, then it is probably a path worth
taking.
But the larger mission of this essay is to highlight another point –
namely the mistake entailed in devoting any significant set of wireless
frequencies to broadcasting. The costs of that devotion are so great that
they justify, in a benefit/cost analysis, measures that impose deadweight
losses on broadcasters as a means of pushing broadcasting off the
spectrum. If that is so, then we should prefer a transition toward greater
flexibility in spectrum usage without having the considerable costs
entailed in slowly choking off the profits of over-the-air broadcasting.
Promulgating regulations that impose deadweight losses will hasten the
movement of broadcasting off the spectrum, but the process will still take
years and thus impose prolonged transition costs. If we could transition
to more valued uses of the spectrum cleanly and quickly, we would be
better off. We would have the same benefits and lower costs. This
transition could occur in a way that would make broadcasters very happy
(conferring value on them by giving them greater flexibility in the
spectrum usage) or ways that might not make them happy (requiring
them to pay for greater flexibility and/or assigning their frequencies to
other users), but any of these outcomes would be preferable to the slow
transition that inefficient regulations would entail.
There are some situations in which a slow, measured approach is
ideal. Spectrum policy is not one of them. Opening up broadcast
spectrum to other uses will create enormous value. One way or another,
we need to hasten that process. Spectrum regulators of the world, unite!
You have nothing to lose but your jobs.

